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A BETTER ADEA?: USING STATE WAGE




The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA")' is
"the first federal statute which had as its purpose a prevention of discrimination
in employment on account of age, by providing a remedy to... victims of age
discrimination."2 Subject to certain limited exceptions,3 the ADEA prohibits
employers from discriminating against persons forty years of age or over.' That
prohibition is patterned after the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex and national origin in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII").'
However, unlike Title VII, which is "a comprehensive and detailed statuto-
ry scheme... provid[ing] specific remedies for [the] rights created therein,"
the ADEA contains no specific remedial provisions for the enforcement of its
prohibitions Rather, the ADEA is enforced primarily through incorporation of
f B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix, Arizona;
Chairman, Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations Board; Editor, The Arizona Labor Letter.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
2. Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The stated purpose of the ADEA
is "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
3. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f), 631(c) (1988).
4. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (1988). As originally enacted, the ADEA only protected persons
between the ages of forty and sixty-five. See Crozier v. Howard, 11 F.3d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1993). The
upper age limit for the ADEA's protected class was extended to seventy in 1978, and eliminated entirely in
1986. See id.
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)
("There are important similarities between the two statutes ... both in their aims-the elimination of discrim-
ination from the workplace-and in their substantive prohibitions. In fact, the prohibitions of the ADEA were
derived in haec verba from Title VII."); Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 1976) ("The
prohibitions of the ADEA are in terms virtually identical to those of Title VII... except that 'age' has been
substituted for 'race, color, religion, sex or national origin."').
6. Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (D. Colo. 1985).
7. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The ADEA's
proscription against age discrimination is [not] enforced... through independent ADEA remedies.").
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various Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")8 provisions.9 Where the ADEA
has been violated, the FLSA provides for recovery of any unpaid wages"0 and,
if the employer's discriminatory conduct has been willful," an additional,
equal amount of liquidated damages. 2 Compensatory and punitive damages,
on the other hand, are not available under either the FLSA'3 or the ADEA. 4
Courts and commentators have occasionally suggested that existing reme-
dies for discrimination may be insufficient both under the ADEA 5 and other
8. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988). Congress passed the FLSA to protect workers from substandard
wages by requiring the payment of a uniform minimum wage and additional compensation for overtime work
to most individuals employed in interstate commerce. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207; Stewart v. Region II Child
& Family Serv., 788 P.2d 913, 917 (Mont. 1990) (observing Congress passed the FLSA to "maintain a mini-
mum living standard" for workers); Elkins v. Showcase, Inc., 704 P.2d 977, 987 (Kan. 1985) ("The expressed
Congressional purpose in passing the FLSA was to enable a substantial part of the American workforee to
maintain a minimum standard of living.").
9. Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that the act is to be enforced in accordance with the powers,
remedies and procedures provided for in the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. §626(b) (1988); see also Lorillard, 434
U.S. at 584-85 ("[Rlather than adopting the procedures of Title VII for ADEA actions, Congress rejected that
course in favor of incorporating the FLSA procedures even while adopting Title Vl's substantive prohibi-
tions.'); Kelly v. American Standard Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[The ADEA] is enforced
through express incorporation of the remedial rights and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act... rath-
er than through independent ADEA remedies."); Morelock, 546 F.2d at 687 ("Although the prohibitory provi-
sions of Title VII and the ADEA are in terms identical, the enforcement sections of these acts differ. The
enforcement provisions of ... the ADEA essentially follow those of the Fair Labor Standards Act... .").
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). "Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of [the ADEA are]
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of... the Fair Labor
Standards Act...." Drez v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 674 F. Supp. 1432, 1440 (D. Kan. 1987) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 626(b)).
11. An employer's conduct is considered willful for this purpose if it either knew or showed reckless
disregard for whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 614-17 (1993).
12. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (1988). The characterization of the additional damages available for
willful violations of the ADEA as "liquidated" has been described as a misnomer, on the ground that they are
more akin to punitive damages. See Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J.,
dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Eggleston v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 858 F. Supp. 841, 853 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(observing that "compensatory damages are not recoverable under the ELSA'); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck
Line Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[Dlamages for pain and suffering have never been awarded
under the FLSA.); Skrove v. Heiraas, 303 N.W.2d 526, 531-32 (N.D. 1981) (holding that punitive damages
are unavailable under the FLSA); King v. J.C. Penney Co., 58 F.R.D. 649, 650 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ("The
F.L.S.A. itself does not provide for the recovery of punitive damages, and this court is unaware of any judi-
cial decision allowing punitive damages to be recovered.").
14. See, e.g., Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 966 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[A]I! ... circuits that
have [addressed the issue]... deny punitive damages in ADEA cases.'); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d
691, 699 (9th Cir. 1981) ("All circuit courts that have addressed [the] question have concluded that the ADEA
does not authorize an award of damages for pain and suffering."); Bailey v. Container Corp., 594 F. Supp.
629, 633 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ("[N]either compensatory nor punitive damages are available under the ADEA.");
but see Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1132 (N.D. Il. 1976) (concluding that "a
plaintiff under the [ADEA] is entitled to demonstrate damages for pain and suffering"), aff d on reh'g, 432 F.
Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
15. See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1977) (describing
the unavailability of damages for emotional distress under the ADEA as "a disappointing (result] to... plain-
tiffs"); Bertrand, 419 F. Supp. at 1132 ('The real injury suffered by [an age] discriminatee may ... be poorly
compensated by an award of mere back wages."); Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093,
1206-07 n.365 (1993) (suggesting that "[t]he denial of [compensatory and punitive] damages in age cases ...
[may have had a] negative effect.., on the enforcement and litigation of age discrimination claims" because
"the lack of such valuable remedies" has contributed to "a dearth of attorneys willing and able to litigate
ADEA cases') (quoting Catherine Ventrell-Monsees, Ageism: The Segregation of a Civil Right, EXCHANGE
ON AGEING, LAW & ETMiCS, BULLETIN No. 8, Spring 1992, at 4-5).
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employment discrimination statutes. 6 This deficiency 7 was addressed, in
part, by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 CRA").' That act expanded
the remedies available to employment discrimination victims' 9 by making com-
pensatory and punitive damages available in certain cases of intentional wrong-
doing." In the age discrimination context, however, the perceived remedial
deficiency has not been corrected by that enactment, because the provision of
the 1991 CRA that expanded the remedies available to some victims of employ-
ment discrimination21 does not apply in ADEA cases.'
An alternative means of addressing the perceived insufficiency of statutory
discrimination remedies is reflected in cases permitting tort recovery' for a
16. See Broomfield v. Lundell, 767 P.2d 697, 705 (Ariz. CL App. 1988) (observing that statutory reme-
dies for discrimination "may, at times, prove to be inadequate"); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d
1292, 1303 (Or. 1984) (concluding that statutory remedies for discrimination often "fail to capture the person-
al nature of the injury done to a wrongfully discharged employe [sic]").
17. There are, of course, those who do not perceive the ADEA to be deficient at all, but who believe
instead that Congress specifically did not intend to provide for the recovery of tort damages under that act.
See, e.g., Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 967 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Conyers v. Safelite Glass
Corp., 825 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Kan. 1993) (characterizing the statutory remedies available under the ADEA
as "adequate"). Underlying that conclusion is the view that the availability of tort damages might undermine
the ADEA goal of encouraging the voluntary resolution of age discrimination disputes because plaintiffs who
cannot recover tort damages "more willingly participate in agency reconciliation efforts." Bruno, 829 F.2d at
967. See generally Eggleston v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 858 F. Supp. 841, 853 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(quoting BARBARA L. ScHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DiscRImNATIoN LAW 525-27 (2d ed.
1983)):
[R]ecoverability under the ADEA of the full panoply of tort remedies could interfere with the
EEOC's efforts to reconcile informally the parties through conciliation by creating an incentive for
bypassing the administrative processes, since the plaintiff would be more interested in the possibility
of large jury awards than in good faith negotiations with the defendant.
18. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The passage of the 1991 CRA was the result of a
lengthy and sometimes bitter struggle in Congress over the issue of civil rights reform. See Tyler v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In late November of [1991], Congress culminated a
two-year political struggle with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ... "); Joyner v. Monier Roof &
Tile Inc., 784 F. Supp. 872, 876 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("The signing of the new Act on November 21, 1991 culmi-
nated an often bitter two year effort by many members of Congress to enact some form of civil rights pro-
tection.").
19. See David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8 LAB. LAw. 849, 850
(1992). For a broader consideration of the 1991 CRA by the author, see Michael D. Moberly & Linda H.
Miles, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on Individual Title VII Liability, 18 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV.
475 (1993).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1993). Specifically, the 1991 CRA "authorize[s] recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages from a respondent in a Title VII action who ... engage[s] in unlawful
intentional discrimination not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Berry v. North Ala. Elec. Coop., 61 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1331, 1333 (N.D. Ala. 1993). Prior to the act's passage, compensatory and punitive
damages were available only to victims of race or ethnic discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; individuals
alleging sex or religious discrimination under Title VII were only entitled to equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (1988); see generally Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 19, at 850.
21. The pertinent provision "changed the remedial structure of Title VII [so that] plaintiffs may seek
compensatory damages in cases alleging intentional race, color, religion, sex, or national origin discrimination
or retaliation against opponents for [sic] such discrimination... :'Eggleston v. South Bend Community Sch.
Corp., 858 F. Supp. 841, 853 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
22. See Lee v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 921, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("We note that the 1991 [CRA] ...
does not authorize compensatory damages for age discrimination."); Morgan v. Servicemaster Co. Ltd. Part-
nership, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423, 1424 (N.D. Dl. 1992) (observing that "age" is not one of the
types of discrimination the CRA was intended to "clarify"). The failure of Congress to address age discrimi-
nation when it expanded the remedies available to other victims of employment discrimination has been
sharply criticized. See, e.g., Eglit, supra note 15, at 1206 n.365 (discussing Ventrell-Monsees, supra note 15).
23. See Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Okla. 1992) (discussing cases permitting
"tort remedies [to] supplement employment discrimination statutes" where the statutory remedies are per-
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wrongful discharge24 which violates public policy reflected in the ADEA'
and other age discrimination legislation.' However, that approach also may be
unsatisfactory, because many courts refuse to extend the public policy exception
to the employment at will rule27 on which the tort is based28 beyond the
wrongful discharge context.29 Thus, victims of age discrimination in hiring and
promotion3" may continue to be limited to remedies that "at times, prove to be
inadequate,"' even though the public policies underlying the ADEA and other
employment discrimination laws clearly apply to hiring and promotion deci-
sions.32
ceived to be inadequate).
24. Although the term "wrongful discharge" (or "wrongful termination") is occasionally given a broader
interpretation, see, e.g., Ronald Weisenberger, Note, Remedies for Employer's Wrongful Discharge of an Em-
ployee from Employment of an Indefinite Duration, 21 IND. L. REV. 547, 566 n,116 (1988) ("'Wrongful
discharge' refers to any discharge for which the employer is or may be liable."), in the present context the
term refers to a common law tort claim premised upon the "public policy" exception to the employment at
will rule. See, e.g., Woerth v. City of Flagstaff, 808 P.2d 297, 303 (Ariz. CL App. 1990); Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 467 & n.2 (Md. CL App. 1981).
25. But see Conyers v. Safelite Glass Corp., 825 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Kan. 1993):
The essence of... decisions recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge is that the law imposes
a duty upon all employers to refrain from discharging employees when this action violates important
public policies. When, however, Congress or [a state] legislature has already seen fit to embody that
same public policy in an adequate statutory remedy such as the ADEA... courts [should] defer to
the remedies and procedures created by the legislature for the vindication of those policies.
(Quotations and citations omitted.)
26. See, e.g., Gesina v. General Elec. Co., 780 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Ariz. CL App. 1989) ("An employee's
right not to be discharged on the basis of age is a common law right based upon public policy and is indepen-
dent of any rights accruing under either state or federal civil rights statutes.'); Bernstein v. Aetna Life &
Casualty, 843 F.2d 359, 361, 364-65 (9th Cir. 1988) (employee alleging age discrimination in violation of the
ADEA also permitted to pursue common law wrongful discharge claim based on same factual allegations);
Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588-90 (Vt. 1986) (recognizing a common law wrongful discharge claim
based on the "clear and compelling public policy against age discrimination').
27. The employment at will rule has been described as "uniquely a product of the American common
law." Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 252 (Ariz. 1986). The "classic statement" of the rule is that an
employer may discharge an employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without
being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211 (N.D.
1987) (quoting Payne v. Western & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds
by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)).
28. As a general proposition, the public policy exception protects employees from being discharged for
performing an act that public policy encourages or refusing to perform an act that public policy condemns.
See Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 256 (Ariz. 1986). For the author's view of the exception, see
Michael D. Moberly, Begging the Federal Question: Removal Jurisdiction in Wrongful Discharge Cases, 20
SEATrTLE U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996); Michael D. Moberly, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of
"Public Policy" Wrongful Discharge Claims, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 525, 526-27 (1993).
29. See, e.g., Mintz v. Bell At]. Sys. Leasing Int'l, 905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("We know
of no court that recognizes the tort of wrongful failure-to-promote."); Burris v. City of Phoenix, 875 P.2d
1340, 1348 (Ariz. CL App. 1993) ("[W]e have found no state or federal court that has recognized the tort of
wrongful failure to hire even though federal law and the laws of many states prohibit discrimination in hir-
ing ..... '). See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Wrongful Refusal to Hire: Attacking the Other Half of the Em-
ployment-at-Will Rule, 24 CoNN. L. REv. 97, 114 (1991) (observing that the "common law modifications of
employment at will have been limited to wrongful discharge").
30. In some jurisdictions, employees subjected to discriminatory demotions may be permitted to pursue
common law tort remedies, see, e.g., Zimmerman v. Buccheit of Sparta, 615 N.E.2d 791,792-94 (111. App. Ct.
1993), rev'd, 645 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. 1994); Hoopes v. City of Chester, 473 F. Supp. 1214, 1223 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
1979), on the ground that demotions are more closely analogous to discharges than are promotions and hiring
decisions. See Zimmerman, 615 N.E.2d at 793 (concluding that there is "little difference" between termina-
tions and demotions); but see LaFriniere v. Group W Cable Inc., 670 F. Supp. 897, 898 (D. Mont. 1987)
("[Uinder Montana law, an employee has no cause of action for wrongful demotion.").
31. Broomfield v. Lundell, 767 P.2d 697, 705 (Ariz. Ci App. 1988).
32. See, e.g., Burris, 875 P.2d at 1348; but cf. Crommie v. California, 61 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
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Applying state wage payment statutes in ADEA cases may represent a
more promising means of expanding the remedies available for age discrimi-
nation?3 Proponents of that approach34 argue that, given the limited remedies
available under the ADEA, state legislatures should be allowed to "provide
remedies for discriminatees in addition to those provided for in the [ADEA]." 35
Opponents of that view, on the other hand, contend that Congress intended to
preclude state legislation "on the matter of what damages are available under
the ADEA.'
36
This article explores the relative merits of those conflicting views.37 Parts
II and I of the article discuss arguments for and against the use of state laws
to supplement the remedies available under the ADEA.3 Part IV analyzes the
issue further by considering closely analogous FLSA cases.39 Part V considers
the ADEA deferral provision's impact on state wage payment laws.' The arti-
cle ultimately concludes that the language of the ADEA and the manner in
which its deferral provision operates" strongly suggest that the federal statuto-
ry remedies are exclusive in ADEA cases4
II. THE VIEW THAT SUPPLEMENTAL STATE LAW REMEDIES ARE AUTHORIZED
Most states have statutes regulating the payment of wages,43 many of
which are potentially applicable in cases involving violations of federal discrim-
ination laws such as the ADEA.' In many cases, the remedies available under
142,286, at 75,387 (N.D. Cal. 1993) ("Clearly, California law supplies a cause of action in tort to workers
who are denied promotions in retaliation for challenging their employers' unlawful business practices.");
Rothstein, supra note 29, at 102 (asserting that "a judicially-recognized public policy exception to the at-will
rule should be applied to hiring").
33. See generally Elizabeth D. Harter, Paying the Price of Judicial Activism Under the Wage Payment
and Collection Act, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 743, 744 (1994) ("[A]s the rights of the American worker continue to
be enhanced, state [wage payment] statutes ... are subjected to the expansive interpretation of activist
courts.").
34. See id. at 745 (observing that "employee advocates constantly pursue novel [wage payment act]
theories both to avoid less advantageous... federal laws and to take advantage of [a wage payment act's]
broad remedial provisions').
35. Bailey v. Container Corp., 594 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
36. Id. at 632.
37. See generally National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1986) (observing that
"state... wage payment act[s] ... seem rich in potential for conflict with ... federal labor and employee
financial security laws").
38. See infra notes 43-114 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 115-39 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 140-75 and accompanying text.
41. One court has stated that the construction of the deferral provision is "not easy," with many judges
having "failed to comprehend [its] details." Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1130
(N.D. Ill. 1976).
42. See infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
43. See National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1986). The purpose of such stat-
utes generally is to protect employees by "insur[ing] the regularity and frequency of wage payments," Atehley
v. Heritage Cable Vision Assocs., 904 F. Supp. 870, 875 (N.D. Ind. 1995), and "assist[ing] them in the collec-
tion of compensation wrongly withheld." Mullins v. Venable, 297 S.E.2d 866, 869 (W. Va. 1982).
44. See, e.g., Davis v. Jobs for Progress Inc., 427 F. Supp. 479 (D. Ariz. 1976) (holding that an employ-
er who failed to compensate a female employee at the same rate as similarly-situated employees in violation
of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), could be liable for treble damages
5
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those wage payment statutes exceed the remedies provided for directly under
the applicable federal law.45
Arizona, for example, has a statute providing for the recovery of treble
damages when an employer fails to pay wages due to an employee.' The Ari-
zona legislature has defined "wages" for purposes of that statute to mean "com-
pensation due an employee in return for labor or services rendered.., for
which the employee has a reasonable expectation to be paid."'47 Whether that
definition encompasses amounts due as the result of ADEA violations' is an
open question.49 However, the state statute is at least arguably applicable in
ADEA cases in which the plaintiff has been compensated at a lower rate than
similarly-situated younger employees."
In Davis v. Jobs for Progress,5' for example, the court held that an em-
ployer that violated Title VII by failing to compensate a female employee at the
same rate as similarly-situated male employees could be liable for treble damag-
es under the Arizona wage payment statute.52 Although the court ultimately
declined to award treble damages, 3 it cited the Title VII saving clause54 and
under Arizona's wage payment statute).
45. Cf. Aragon v. Bravo Harvesting, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 982, 984 (D. Ariz. 1993) (observ-
ing that "the remedies provided under Arizona statutory and common law are more beneficial to employees
than remedies provided under the FLSA"). See generally Alaska Int'l Indus. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240, 1246
(Alaska 1979) (observing that "state law[s] on [the] payment of [wages] may differ from the standards set
forth in [a] federal statute").
46. See ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-355 (West 1995). That provision is not unusual. Cf. W. VA. CODE
§ 21-5-4 (1989) (providing for the recovery of "liquidated" damages when an employer "falls to pay an em-
ployee wages").
47. Aim. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-350.5 (West 1995). This definition is fairly representative of that ap-
pearing in other state wage payment acts. Cf. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(c) (1989) (defining "wages" to mean
"compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee").
48. Amounts owing due to discriminatory employer conduct are deemed to be unpaid "wages" for pur-
poses of the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988); Drez v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 674 F. Supp. 1432, 1440
(D. Kan. 1987).
49. Cf. Marshall v. Bernat Enters., 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 78 (D. Ariz. 1978) (concluding that the
Arizona legislature did not intend for the Arizona treble damage statute to apply in cases involving FLSA
violations).
50. See, e.g., Foster v. Arcata Assocs., 772 F.2d 1453, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985) (considering a claim of
"intentional wage discrimination because of [the plaintiff's] age in violation of ADEA").
51. 427 F. Supp. 479 (D. Ariz. 1976).
52. See id. at 483.
53. See id. The award of treble damages under the Arizona statute is discretionary. See Apache East, Inc.
v. Wiegand, 580 P.2d 769, 773 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Aragon v. Bravo Harvesting, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d
(BNA) 982, 984 n.8 (D. Ariz. 1993). In exercising its discretion to decline to make such an award, the Davis
court relied upon Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973), where the court refused
to permit a Title VII plaintiff to recover punitive damages under state law because (at the time) such damages
were not available under Title VII. See id. at 835-38, 840.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994). In the present context, the term "saving clause" refers to a provi-
sion in a federal statutory scheme that prevents a state law regulating the same subject from being preempted
by the federal scheme. See Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 828 F. Supp. 379, 384 (D.S.C. 1993); see
also Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890, 900 (Alaska 1980) (noting that "a saving clause may prevent
preemption of state statutes which conflict with the purpose of a federal statute"). The Title VII saving clause
"was designed to preserve the effectiveness of state antidiscrimination laws," Jones v. Metal Prods. Co., 281
N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ohio 1972), and state laws therefore are preempted by Title VII "only if they actually conflict
with federal law." Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Okla. 1992) (emphasis omitted).
6
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a Supreme Court decision interpreting Title VII in holding that the Arizona
statute was not preempted. 6
That conclusion appears to be correct,5 7 because the Arizona statute is
intended to punish employers who fail to compensate their employees in accor-
dance with the law,"5 and Title VII's saving clause specifically provides that
Title VII does not relieve an employer from any "punishment" provided for
under state law.59 However, because the ADEA contains no specific counter-
part to Title VII's saving clause,' the impact of Davis in ADEA cases is un-
clear.'
The Davis court nevertheless provided some guidance on the issue by
indicating that, like Title VII,62 the FLSA does not preempt the Arizona wage
payment statute.63 That view was reiterated in Spieth v. Adasen Distributing'
55. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). Johnson held that Title VII does not
preempt employment discrimination actions against private employers under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), which prohibits racial discrimination in contractual relations. See Keller v. Prince
George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 956 (4th Cir. 1987). "Despite Title VII's comprehensive framework, the
[Johnson] Court concluded from the legislative history of Title VII that Congress intended to allow individu-
als independently to pursue their rights under Title VII and other applicable federal statutes." Id.
56. See Davis v. Jobs for Progress, 427 F. Supp. 479, 483 (D. Ariz. 1976); cf. Munday Constr. Co. v.
Waste Management of N. Am., 858 F. Supp. 1364, 1381 (D. Md. 1994) (relying on Title VII's savings clause
to hold that "state laws which provide additional.., remedies for employment discrimination are not pre-
empted as such by Title VII").
57. See Rains v. Criterion Sys., 80 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Title VII does not completely pre-
empt state law. Rather Title VII only preempts state law inconsistent with it."); Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,
833 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Okla. 1992) ("[S]tates' remedies for relief from employment discrimination and for the
compensation of its victims may be both different from and broader than those provided by Title VII."); but
see Munday Constr., 858 F. Supp. at 1381 (stating that a plaintiff "should not be permitted to obtain damages
under state law which are unavailable under the very federal law [Title VII] which itself provides the right
which plaintiff is enforcing"); National Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1338, 1349 (D.
Conn. 1978) (interpreting Van Hoomissen as precluding a Title VII plaintiff from "utilizing state law to obtain
a remedy which would not be available under the federal law claim").
58. See, e.g., Apache East, Inc. v. Wiegand, 580 P.2d 769, 773 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) ("[Ihe treble
damages provision authorized by the legislature... was directed against employers who seek to delay pay-
ment of wages without reasonable justification or who seek to defraud employees of wages earned."); Rogers
v. Speros Const. Co., 580 P.2d 750, 754 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that a contractor's liability to under-
paid employees of a subcontractor would not include liability for treble damages under the statute).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994); but cf. Munday Constr., 858 F. Supp. at 1381 (holding that, not-
withstanding the saving clause, a Title VII plaintiff "should not be permitted to obtain damages under state
law which are unavailable under the very federal law which itself provides the right which [the] plaintiff is
enforcing').
60. See Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 851 F. Supp. 543, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Godby v. Electrolux
Corp., 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 211, 212 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1994); but cf. Lukus v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 419 A.2d 431, 444 n.20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (observing, without explanation, that "the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act... contains a savings provision similar to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7").
61. In Zamore v. Dyer, 597 F. Supp. 923 (D. Conn. 1984), the court held that "any age discrimination
decisions regarding preemption are inapposite" in Title VII cases because the ADEA has no counterpart to the
Title VII saving clause. Id. at 928 n.4; cf. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 117 (7th Cir.
1990) (concluding that ADEA precedents are not dispositive in Title VII cases "since the remedial schemes of
the two statutes differ markedly"). The converse proposition-that Title VII preemption decisions are inap-
posite in ADEA cases-presumably is equally true. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1978) (de-
clining to follow Title VII precedent in interpreting ADEA remedial provisions because of the "significant
differences" between the "remedial and procedural provisions of the two laws"); but cf. Mummelthie v. City
of Mason City, 873 F. Supp. 1293, 1324 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (concluding that "the exclusivity of the ADEA
may properly be considered by analogy to Title VIl"), affd, 78 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 1996).
62. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
63. See Davis v. Jobs for Progress, 427 F. Supp. 479, 483 (D. Ariz. 1976). The court undoubtedly found
it appropriate to address this issue because the plaintiff had asserted a claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
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and Aragon v. Bravo Harvesting,' and because the ADEA generally incorpo-
rates the FLSA remedial scheme,' suggests that the holding in Davis may ap-
ply in ADEA cases. 7
Consistent with that view, other courts have concluded that state statutory
remedies exceeding those available under the ADEA can be invoked to expand
a plaintiff's recovery for age discrimination." In Bailey v. Container Corp. of
America,69 for example, the plaintiff brought suit under the ADEA after his
employment was terminated." He also alleged a claim under Ohio's age dis-
crimination statute,7' which provided for the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages72 that are unavailable under the ADEA.73
The employer moved to dismiss the claim for compensatory and punitive
damages,7" arguing that "Congress intended to displace state legislation on the
matter of what damages are available under the ADEA."75 The court denied
the motion, concluding that the plaintiff could invoke state statutory remedies
for age discrimination "because there is no clear statement of Congressional in-
tent to preempt, no requirement upon any party to act in accordance with state
law at the risk of violating federal law, and nothing inherent in the nature of
age discrimination which requires federal preeminence."76
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), and the Equal Pay Act "is a part of the Fair Labor Standards Act." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1620.1 (1995); see also Hill v. J.C. Penney Co., 688 F.2d 370, 372 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The rubric Equal
Pay Act refers to one portion of the comprehensive Fair Labor Standards Act.").
64. 29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 252, 253-54 (D. Ariz. 1989).
65. 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 982, 984-87 (D. Ariz. 1993).
66. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
67. See Coston v. Plitt Theatres, 831 F.2d 1321, 1328 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that courts must fol-
low the FLSA "in the computation of damages" under the ADEA), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1020
(1988); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("[The] conclusion reached with
respect to the [FLSA] is the conclusion required by the reference to it in [the] ADEA.).
68. See Hillman v. Consumers Power Co., 282 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that
"Congress did not expressly or impliedly oust the states from their power to legislate as to age discrimina-
tion").
69. 594 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
70. See id. at 630.
71. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Anderson 1980) (recodified at OmIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.14 (Supp. 1995)).
72. See Bailey, 594 F. Supp. at 634; see also Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1055, 1061 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (finding that "compensatory damages are available under... § 4101.17'); but see Schlosser v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1403, 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that a
"request for general, compensatory, and punitive damages pursuant to § 4101.17 fails to state a claim").
73. See Bailey, 594 F. Supp. at 633.
74. See id. at 630.
75. Id. at 632 (internal quotations omitted). However, the employer cited no authority supporting that
proposition. See id.
76. Id. at 633. The court based its holding in part upon the decision in Simpson v. Alaska State Comm'n
for Human Rights, 423 F. Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976), affid, 608 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979). See Bailey, 594
F. Supp. at 632. In Simpson, the court rejected the employer's argument that state age discrimination statutes
are preempted to the extent that they are broader than the ADEA, noting that "Congress intended only to
establish 'minimum' standards" in enacting the ADEA. Simpson, 423 F. Supp. at 556. The Simpson court
therefore held that a state statute that contained no upper age limit was not preempted even though the ADEA
(at the time) only prohibited employment discrimination based on age against "persons [aged] 40 through 64."
Id. at 555-56; cf. Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Kennebec Water Power Co., 468 A.2d 307 (Me. 1983)
(reaching a similar conclusion with respect to another state age discrimination statute). The Simpson court
stated:
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A similar result was reached in Hillman v. Consumers Power Co.' The
plaintiff in that case retired after being bypassed for a promotion in favor of a
younger coworker.78 The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against his em-
ployer under Michigan law alleging that he had been denied a promotion and
effectively forced to retire79 because of his age."0 The trial court entered judg-
ment in favor of the employer on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was
preempted by the ADEA,8' and the plaintiff appealed."2
Noting that the ADEA preemption issue was one of first impression in
Michigan, the appellate court began its analysis by observing that preemption
occurs "when compliance with both Federal and State regulations is physically
impossible, when the nature of the subject matter requires Federal supremacy
and uniformity or when Congress intended to displace the State legislation."'
The court noted that the state law at issue was not preempted under the first
prong of this test because an employer could comply with both the state and
federal statutes 4 merely by refraining from engaging in age discrimination."
The court also concluded that Congress has not expressly or impliedly divested
the states of authority to legislate with respect to age discrimination, 6 noting
Since there are no specific conflicts between the state and federal statutes and since Congress has
expressly left the states the power to act in this field, the fact that [the state] has gone beyond the
federal government in enacting a complementary scheme in this area does not make the [state] law
void.
Simpson, 423 F. Supp. at 556.
77. 282 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. CL App. 1979).
78. See id. at 423. Replacement by a younger individual is a significant element of an ADEA plaintiff's
prima facie case. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996) (noting
that a plaintiff's replacement by a "substantially younger" worker is a "reliable indicator of age discrimina-
tion'.
79. Whether a resignation or retirement was "forced" (that is, whether the plaintiff was "constructively
discharged') is a frequently litigated ADEA issue. See Ira M. Saxe, Note, Constructive Discharge Under the
ADEA: An Argument for the Intent Standard, 55 FouRnHAM L. REv. 963, 972 (1987) ("Although it is well
recognized that constructive discharge is actionable under the ADEA .... disagreement exists regarding the
elements required to establish the plaintiff's case."); Sheila Finnegan, Comment, Constructive Discharge Un-
der Title VII and the ADEA, 53 U. Cr. L. REV. 561, 569 (1986) (referring to the "very different orientations"
of the "two principal tests [that have evolved] for evaluating constructive discharge claims under... the
ADEA).
As a general proposition, a constructive discharge occurs where the employer deliberately makes an
employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is effectively forced to resign. See Bourque v.
Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980). The denial of a promotion ordinarily is insufficient to
satisfy that standard. See Bristow v. Daily Press, 770 F.2d 1251, 1256 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985); Nobler v. Beth
Israel Medical Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 1023, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
80. See Hillman, 282 N.W.2d at 423-24.
81. As a general proposition, the case for ADEA preemption is weak. Indeed, a regulation issued by the
Department of Labor specifically states: "The ADEA does not preempt State age discrimination in employ-
ment laws." 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(g) (1995).
82. See Hillman, 282 N.W.2d at 424.
83. Id. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)); cf. Simpson v. Alaska
State Comm'n for Human Rights, 423 F. Supp. 552, 555 (D. Alaska 1976) (applying same test), affd, 608
F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979).
84. See Simpson, 423 F. Supp. at 554 ("delineating the scope of the [state] statute ... is the first step
necessary to determine if the [ADEA] has preempted the states in the field of age discrimination').
85. See Hillman, 282 N.W.2d at 424. The absence of preemption on this ground is particularly apparent
with respect to state law remedies for age discrimination that exceed those provided for in the ADEA, because
"compliance with both federal and state law in [that regard] is not physically impossible; it simply ups the
ante." Bailey v. Container Corp. of Am., 594 F. Supp. 629, 632 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
86. See Hillman, 282 N.W.2d at 424; cf. Simpson, 423 F. Supp. at 556 ("Nothing in the scope or intent
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that preemption cannot be inferred simply by the comprehensive nature of the
ADEA.87
Indeed, the court observed that the states have historically exercised broad
authority to regulate employment practices," and stated that "[o]nce the power
of the State to regulate is conceded, the remedy and mode of enforcement is a
matter of State discretion, absent such a conflict with Federal remedies as will
require application of the doctrine of Federal supremacy."89 Because the court
perceived no such conflict in the age discrimination context,' it held that there
is "no sound basis to conclude that the [ADEA] precludes [state law] reme-
dies."'"
III. THE VIEW THAT SUPPLEMENTAL STATE LAW REMEDIES ARE PRECLUDED
The view that supplemental state law remedies are preempted by the
ADEA is perhaps best represented by Chambers v. Capital CitiesIABC.Y The
plaintiff in Chambers brought suit under the ADEA,93 and sought to supple-
ment his potential remedies by invoking a provision of the New York City
Human Rights Law94 that provides victims of unlawful discrimination with a
right to recover punitive damages.' The employer moved to dismiss the claim
for punitive damages," arguing that the city ordinance was inconsistent with
the purposes of the ADEA.'
The court began its analysis by observing that because the ADEA contains
no express preemption provision," states and their instrumentalities are free to
of the [ADEA] indicates that Congress intended to oust the states from this area of concern.").
87. See Hillman, 282 N.W.2d at 424; but cf. Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364,
1366 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the ADEA's "comprehensive statutory scheme" is "inconsistent with the
notion that the remedies it affords could be supplanted by alternative judicial relief'); Ring v. Crisp County
Hosp. Auth., 652 F. Supp. 477, 482 (M.D. Ga. 1987) ("By establishing the ADEA's comprehensive scheme
for the resolution of employee complaints of age discrimination, Congress clearly intended that all claims of
age discrimination be limited to the rights and procedures authorized by the ADEA.").
88. See Hillman, 282 N.W.2d at 424; see also Simpson, 423 F. Supp. at 556 ("In the field of employ-
ment practices states possess broad authority under their police powers and state laws in the field are not
easily preempted.").
89. Hillman, 282 N.W.2d at 425.
90. Cf Bailey, 594 F. Supp. at 632 (referring to the "peaceful coexistence of federal and state regulation
of employment discrimination in recent years').
91. Hillman, 282 N.W.2d at 425; see also Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 209-
10 (6th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the ADEA does not preempt an award of emotional distress under the
Michigan age discrimination statute).
92. 851 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
93. See id. at 544.
94. NEw YoRK Crry, N.Y. ADmIN. CODE §§ 8-101 to 8-807 (1992).
95. See Chambers, 851 F. Supp. at 544. In pertinent part, the city ordinance provided that "any person
claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice... shall have a cause of action in any court
of competent jurisdiction for damages, including punitive damages." NEw YORK CITY, N.Y. ADmIN. COD
§ 8-502(a) (1992).
96. See Chambers, 851 F. Supp at 544.
97. See id. at 545.
98. See id at 545; United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, Alachua County, Fla., 23 F.3d 359, 362 (11th Cir.
1994) (noting that "the ADEA [does] not contain an express statement of preemption"); Hillman v. Consum-
ers Power Co., 282 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that "Congress did not expressly...
oust the states from their power to legislate as to age discrimination").
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regulate age discrimination as long as their enactments do not frustrate the
objectives of the federal law.99 Noting that the ADEA remedial scheme was
designed to encourage voluntary, prelitigation resolution of age discrimination
disputes,"o the court concluded that "[t]he addition of punitive damages to
[the ADEA's] remedial structure would be a major shift encouraging litigation
rather than settlements.''. Because the potential for an award of punitive
damages "would tend to obliterate resort to mediation and cause the [local] law
to trump all other antidiscrimination laws," the court concluded that application
of the city ordinance would undermine the ADEA's objectives,"a and there-
fore dismissed the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. 3
As suggested earlier,"'s the notion that expansive remedies would under-
mine the conciliation process is one that appears frequently in ADEA cases. 5
In Bruno v. Western Electric Co.,to for example, the court stated that "an
ADEA plaintiff who may be able to recover punitive damages in a court action
would be less inclined to seek reconciliation at the agency level.'1'0
Similarly, the court in Sant v. Mack Trucks0 8 concluded that "[i]f large
tort recoveries are allowable under the ADEA, it is doubtful that alleged age
discriminatees will enter into good faith conference and conciliation when
around the comer lies the possibility of large dollar pain and suffering recover-
ies.""Ito Numerous other courts have reached the same conclusion."0
Other courts have analyzed the issue differently."' In Hillman v. Con-
sumers Power Co., 2 for example, the court rejected the employer's argument
that the recognition of supplemental state remedies would conflict with the
ADEA's "informal voluntary compliance provisions.""3 The court stated:
99. See Chambers, 851 F. Supp. at 545.
100. See id. at 546; cf. Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 505 A.2d 580,588 (NJ. 1986) (discussing the "impor-
tant ADEA statutory goals of... opportunity for voluntary resolution, and avoidance of litigation").
101. Chambers, 851 F. Supp. at 546.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 545.
104. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
105. A particularly colorful expression of that view appears in Platt v. Burroughs, 424 F. Supp. 1329,
1337 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (citations and quotations omitted):
[T]he threat of "large dollar pain and suffering recoveries" ... would aid in the conciliatory...
technique devised by Congress about as much as the "subtle" threat that would be implied if the
alleged discriminatee was permitted to enter the conference room armed with a blackjack and a 45
calibre revolver.
106. 829 F.2d 957 (10th Cir. 1987).
107. Id. at 967.
108. 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
109. Id. at 622.
110. See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1977); Eggleston
v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 858 F. Supp. 841, 853 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l
Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D. Colo. 1977); Platt, 424 F. Supp. at 1337.
111. At least one court has found it unnecessary to reach the issue. See Bailey v. Container Corp. of Am.,
594 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
112. 282 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
113. Id. at 424; see also Bailey, 594 F. Supp. at 633 (discussing the argument that "enhanced remedies
under [state] law may well increase the possibility of conciliation," and concluding that those who favor that
view "probably have a point").
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Different remedies are provided in the State and Federal Statutes. Howev-
er ... the [ADEA] accords a degree of priority to state enforcement in
preference to Federal enforcement. From such subordination, we infer that
Congress, as a general principle, intended to encourage state enforcement
rather than Federal and did not consider [the pursuit of] state [remedies]
to be inconsistent with Federal enforcement." 4
IV. THE ANALOGY TO FLSA CASES
The conclusion that supplemental state law remedies for age discrimination
are preempted by the ADEA draws additional support from cases interpreting
the FLSA,"5 the ADEA's remedial parent."6 In Hendrix v. Delta Air
Lines,"7 for example, a state appellate court indicated that, in the case of a
failure to pay minimum wages, the FLSA would preempt a state statutory reme-
dy applicable when employers fail to pay wages due to an employee who is
discharged or resigns."'
Citing Divine v. Levy"9  and Sirmon v. Cron & Gracey Drilling
Corp., a° the Hendrix court concluded that because Congress had provided a
remedy for a delay in paying wages due under the LSA, the states probably
114. Hillnan, 282 N.W.2d at 424-25 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1988)); see also Zombro v. Balti-
more City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1376 (4th Cir. 1989) (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (concluding that "Congress intended to tolerate the.., risk that age discrimination plaintiffs
might forego the ADEA remedies" in favor of more attractive alternatives).
115. See, e.g., Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541, 545 (N.D. Ala. 1991) ("[A] plaintiff cannot
circumvent the exclusive remedy prescribed by Congress by asserting equivalent state law claims in addition
to [a] FLSA claim."); Carter v. Marshall, 457 F. Supp. 38, 40-41 (D.D.C. 1978) ("Because the [FLSA] spe-
cifically outlines the type of relief available and also provides for liquidated damages, it appears that Congress
intended the relief provided to be exclusive:); but see Davis v. Jobs for Progress, 427 F. Supp. 479 (D. Ariz.
1976), discussed in text accompanying supra notes 51-63.
116. See Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing the FLSA as a
"parent" of the ADEA). Consistent with its hybrid origins, the ADEA has also been described as an "off-
spring" of Title VII. Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 1976).
117. 234 So. 2d 93 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
118. See id. at 94-95.
119. 36 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. La. 1940). In Divine, the court specifically held that in a case involving a
claim for unpaid minimum wages, the FLSA "supersedes the penalty provisions of the... state statute." Id.
at 58.
120. 44 F. Supp. 29 (W.D. La. 1942). In Sirmon, the court concluded that the same state statute that had
been at issue in Divine was also preempted in a case involving a claim for unpaid overtime. The court rea-
soned that the states are without power to regulate with respect to wages and hours because Congress occu-
pied the field when it enacted the FLSA. See id. at 30-31. The conclusion that Congress has occupied the
field of wage and hour regulation ignores the impact of the FLSA saving clause, 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1988),
and therefore is not correct. See Aragon v. Bravo Harvesting, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 982, 985 (D.
Ariz. 1993) (observing that the FLSA saving clause "reveals that Congress did not intend to 'occupy the
field"); Stewart v. Region H Child & Family Serv., 788 P.2d 913, 917 (Mont. 1990) (stating that "in passing
the F.L.S.A., Congress declined to preempt the entire field of wage and hour regulation"); Pacific Merchant
Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 709 F. Supp. 1516, 1524 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (concluding that "the FLSA would pre-
empt state law, were it not for the FLSA's savings clause'). However, the Sirmon court's apparent failure to
consider the impact of the saving clause does not invalidate its ultimate holding, because a state statute that is
not entirely preempted (i.e., one that falls within the saving clause) nevertheless may be preempted in part.
See Doctors Hosp. v. Silva Recio, 558 F.2d 619, 623 (1st Cir. 1977); cf. Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 505 A.2d
580, 586 (NJ. 1986) (discussing partial preemption in ADEA case).
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were without power to provide a greater remedy for the same wrong. 2' The
court stated:
Where, as in Divine, less than minimum wage is paid, the federal law
provides a 100% penalty and the State may very clearly be unable to
override Congress and decide the penalty for underpayment should be
more. And if the only delay charged is delay in paying the difference
between agreed-upon and minimum, a statute purporting to penalize that
delay might be beyond the State's power."
In Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures," an employee brought suit for
unpaid overtime." 4 He elected not to pursue a claim directly under the FLSA,
but instead brought suit under state law on the premise that the provisions of
the FLSA were incorporated into his employment contract."z
The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that
the FLSA provides the exclusive remedy for a failure to compensate employees
for overtime."n The court noted that Congress had amended the FLSA on sev-
eral occasions in an effort to avoid imposing unanticipated and economically
disruptive liabilities on employers, 27 while simultaneously assuring a mini-
mally acceptable level of compensation for employees."2 The court concluded
that these amendments were indicative of an intent to preempt alternative state
law remedies that are more beneficial to employees than the FLSA remedy. 9
The holdings in Hendrix and Lerwill are instructive because the ADEA's
incorporation of the FLSA remedial scheme suggests that courts should look to
FLSA precedent in analyzing ADEA damages issues.3 ' Indeed, the analysis in
Lerwill was specifically extended to the ADEA in Platt v. Burroughs Corp.'
The plaintiff in Platt alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for filing
a charge of age discrimination' after being demoted and then passed over for
121. See Hendrix, 234 So. 2d at 95.
122. Id.
123. 343 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
124. See id. at 1028.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1028-29.
127. See id. at 1029; see also Stewart v. Region II Child & Family Serv., 788 P.2d 913, 917 (Mont.
1990) (noting that FLSA was amended because judicial interpretations of the Act as originally enacted had
imposed unexpected liabilities on employers).
128. See LerNill, 343 F. Supp. at 1029. Perhaps most significantly, Congress amended the FLSA to make
an award of liquidated damages discretionary in some FLSA cases in an effort to more properly balance the
competing interests of employers and employees. See id.
129. See id.; cf. Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 4 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 564, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)
("Nothing in the [FLSA] suggests anything but a legislative intention to provide a uniform rule as to...
damages, a rule in no way dependent upon the varying standards and provisions of the several states").
130. See, e.g., Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321, 1328 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The ADEA in general
requires that courts follow the Fair Labor Standards Act ... in the computation of damages .... '), vacated
on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1020 (1988); see also Bailey v. Container Corp. of Am., 594 F. Supp. 629, 633
(S.D. Ohio 1984) (analyzing the present issue in light of a state's decision to "provide remedies for
discriminatees in addition to those provided for in the Fair Labor Standards Act").
131. 424 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
132. See id. at 1331. Section 4(d) of the ADEA makes it unlawful for employers to retaliate against their
employees for "ma[king] a charge" under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988).
1996]
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promotion." He brought suit against his former employer and several of its
agents under the ADEA and the Civil Rights Act of 1871.' The defendants
moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff's claim under the Civil Rights
Act'35 was preempted by the ADEA.3 6
The court relied on Lerwill in holding that ADEA remedies are exclusive
in age discrimination cases.'37 The Platt court observed that the reasoning in
Lerwill "amply justifie[d]" that court's conclusion that "the statutory reme-
dy... is the sole remedy available to the employee for enforcement of whatev-
er rights he may have under the FLSA."'3 Referring to the ADEA's incorpo-
ration of the FLSA remedial scheme, the Platt court then stated that "the con-
clusion reached with respect to the Fair [Labor] Standards Act [in Lerwil], is
the conclusion required by the reference to [the FLSA] in the ADEA.' ' 9
V. THE IMPACT OF THE ADEA DEFERRAL PROVISION
The precedential impact of Lerwill in ADEA cases is undermined"'t by
Congress' failure to incorporate into the ADEA several FLSA provisions, 4'
including the FLSA saving clause (which obviously has an impact upon the
preemptive effect of the FLSA).' 3 However, the failure to incorporate the
FLSA saving clause actually supports the conclusion reached in Platt and other
ADEA cases following Lerwill" that the statutory remedies are exclusive in
ADEA cases.'4
133. See Platt, 424 F. Supp. at 1332-33.
134. See id. at 1331, 1340 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 (1988)).
135. Age discrimination claims may not be cognizable under sections 1985 and 1986, see Presnick v.
Berger, 837 F. Supp. 475, 480 (D. Conn. 1993); Brewton v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., No. CIV.A.86-2261,
1991 WL 73173, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 1991); Abbott v. Moore Business Forms Inc., 439 F. Supp. 643, 650
(D.N.H. 1977), but the Platt court found it unnecessary to reach that issue in light of its preemption analysis.
See Platt, 424 F. Supp. at 1340-41.
136. See Platt, 424 F. Supp. at 1331.
137. See id. at 1340.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See generally Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, 873 F. Supp. 1293, 1324 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (con-
cluding that "the exclusivity of the ADEA [should not] be considered by analogy to ... the FLSA"), affd, 78
F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 1996).
141. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985) ("[Ihe remedial provisions of the
two statutes are not identical. Congress declined to incorporate into the ADEA several FLSA sections.");
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (discussing the "selectivity that Congress exhibited in incorporat-
ing [FLSA] provisions" into the ADEA); Cavanaugh v. Texas Instruments, 440 F. Supp. 1124, 1128 (S.D.
Tex. 1977) (observing that "Congress did not... incorporate the exemptions of the FLSA into the ADEA"),
142. Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that the ADEA is to be enforced "in accordance with... sec-
tions 211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217" of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). The
saving clause appears in section 218. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1988).
143. See, e.g., Spieth v. Adasen Distributing, Inc., 29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 252, 253-54 (D. Ariz.
1989); Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890, 899-900 (Alaska 1980).
144. See, e.g., Britt v. The Grocers Supply Co., 978 F.2d 1441, 1448 (5th Cir. 1992); Zombro v. Balti-
more City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir. 1989).
145. Even if the ADEA incorporated the FLSA saving clause, there is serious doubt as to whether the
clause, which "refers only to minimum wages, maximum workweek, and child-labor," Divine v. Levy, 36 F.
Supp. 55, 58 (W.D. La. 1940), saves the remedial provisions of a state wage payment statute. See, e.g.,
Aragon v. Bravo Harvesting, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 982, 986, 987 n.9 (D. Ariz. 1993) (describing
14
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The FLSA saving clause's closest analogue in the ADEA is the ADEA's
"deferral" provision, 146 which "manifests [a] Congressional intent to defer to
the states' efforts to remedy age discrimination within their own bound-
aries." 47 Thus, like the FLSA,'4 the ADEA "expressly anticipates and en-
courages state regulation.' 49
However, the ADEA deferral provision"' has been characterized as re-
flecting only minimal federal deference to state law remedies.' Thus, it pro-
vides little support for the view that state statutory remedies can be used to
expand the ADEA's remedial scheme in cases brought under the federal act.'52
Indeed, the conclusion that supplemental remedies available under a state
wage payment statute are preempted by the ADEA is suggested by the very
language of the deferral provision, which "saves"'5 only those state laws
the issue of whether the FLSA preempts a claim under the Arizona wage payment statute as a "very close
one," and declining to decide whether the FLSA saving clause "permits a state to provide to employees reme-
dies more beneficial than FLSA remedies"). See generally Davenport Taxi Inc. v. Labor Comm'r, 319 A.2d
386, 389 (Conn. 1973) ("Had Congress intended that the states have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce state
laws respecting the domain... covered by the [FLSA] we believe it would not have ... specifically limited
[the saving clause] to instances where the state minimum wage is higher and the state maximum workweek is
lower than wages and hours provided by the FLSA."); Divine, 36 F. Supp. at 58 ("[T]he act of Congress,
through [the saving clause], by implication, supersedes the penalty provisions of the various state statutes on
the relation of employer and employee.").
146. 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1988); see Victa v. Merle Norman Cosmetics Inc., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117, 125 (Cal.
CL App. 1993) (comparing the ADEA deferral provision with the FLSA saving clause); California Hosp.
Ass'n v. Henning, 770 F.2d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 1985) (describing the FLSA's saving clause and the ADEA
deferral provision as "federal laws regulating employee compensation ... [that] permit the states to provide
more stringent protections if they wish").
147. Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp 797, 801 (D.N.H. 1975).
148. See Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890, 899 (Alaska 1980) (stating that "Congress expressly
indicated that it wished to allow state regulations concerning wages and hours").
149. Simpson v. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights, 423 F. Supp. 552, 556 (D. Alaska 1976), affd,
608 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Kennebec Water Power Co., 468
A.2d 307, 310 (Me. 1983) ("It is clear that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to leave room for states
to supply consistent legislation.").
150. The deferral provision states, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Federal action superseding State action
Nothing in this [act] shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State performing like functions
with regard to discriminatory employment practices on account of age except that upon commence-
ment of action under this [act] such action shall supersede any State action.
(b) Limitation of Federal action upon commencement of State proceedings
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimi-
nation in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or
seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title
before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under State law, unless
such proceedings have been earlier terminated ....
29 U.S.C. § 633 (1988).
151. See Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (N.D. fI1. 1976), affd on reh'g,
432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. I1. 1977); see also Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1975)
(stating that the deferral provision requires "respectful but modest deference to a state that has evidenced
interest") (quoting Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Quinn, 465 A.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1972)).
152. See Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 505 A.2d 580, 587 (N.J. 1986) (observing that "deferral should not
be confused with enlargement of the federal right"); see also Bertrand, 419 F. Supp. at 1127 (stating that the
ADEA's deferral provision permits "concurrent federal and state alternatives for victims of age discrimina-
tion') (emphasis added).
153. "Saving" actually is too strong a characterization of the impact of the deferral provision. The provi-
sion merely requires federal deferral to state age discrimination proceedings for sixty days, see Bertrand, 419
F. Supp. at 1130 (referring to "the token sixty-day deference period"), and states that the commencement of
an ADEA action at the conclusion of that period "shall supersede [the] State action." 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)
(1988); see Bertrand, 419 F. Supp. at 1127 ("It is noteworthy that [the deferral provision] ... mandates that
15
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"prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or
authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory
practice."'54 Thus, a plaintiff invoking the ADEA deferral provision must
demonstrate that two separate statutory requirements are satisfied: "[tihere must
be a state law against age discrimination, and there must also be a state authori-
ty charged with granting or seeking relief against such discrimination.' 55
Although the state statute at issue need not "mirror" the ADEA in order to
satisfy the first of these requirements 56 it must specifically address the issue
of age discrimination.'57 Most state wage payment statutes do not satisfy that
requirement, and therefore are not "saved" by the ADEA deferral provision.'58
Even if a state wage payment statute did involve a "specific legislative
authorization to act in the field of [age] discrimination,"'59 that fact, standing
alone, would be insufficient to bring the ADEA deferral provision into play."
In order for the deferral provision to apply, the wage payment act also must
authorize "a state agency.., to seek relief for individuals suffering age dis-
crimination.' ' 61
State wage payment laws ordinarily contain no such provision. The
Arizona statutory scheme, for example, permits an employee to pursue a claim
under the Arizona wage payment statute before the Arizona Industrial Commis-
sion, which has the authority to investigate'" and pursue judicial relief on
the employee's behalf in connection with such a claim.'" However, because
the Industrial Commission is not authorized to address age discrimination,'"
its statutory authority to investigate and litigate claims under Arizona's wage
payment statute is insufficient to trigger application of the ADEA deferral pro-
vision."
an action under the [ADEA] will supersede any state action.").
154. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1988).
155. Bertrand, 419 F. Supp. at 1127.
156. See Nolan, 505 A.2d at 588.
157. See Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1975).
158. As noted earlier, there may be a legitimate question as to whether a state wage payment statute ap-
plies to an age discrimination claim. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text; cf. Aragon v. Bravo Har-
vesting, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 982, 984 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that the Arizona wage payment
statute only applies to contractual claims for wages). In order for the ADEA deferral provision to apply, how-
ever, the state statute must make express reference to age discrimination. See Curry, 513 F.2d at 694.
159. Curry, 513 F.2d at 693.
160. See Mizrany v. Texas Rehabilitation Comm'n, 522 F. Supp. 611, 616-17 (S.D. Tex. 1981), aff d, 685
F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1982).
161. Id. at 616.
162. See, e.g., Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 648 P.2d 234, 244 (Kan. 1982) (noting that the Kansas
employment discrimination laws are enforced by the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights, while the Kansas
Wage Payment Act is enforced by the Kansas Department of Human Resources).
163. See AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-356.A (West 1995). The Arizona Industrial Commission is the state
agency authorized to "[aidminister and enforce all laws for the protection of life, health, safety and welfare of
employees in every case and under every law when such duty is not specifically delegated to any other board
or officer." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN § 23-107.A.2. (West 1995).
164. See ARi Rv. STAT. ANN. § 23-357.A. (West 1995).
165. See ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-356.B. (West 1995).
166. In Arizona, that authority is given to the Arizona Civil Rights Division. See ARIZ. REV, STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1481 (West 1992).
167. In Curry v. ContinentalAirlines, 513 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1975), for example, the court held that
[Vol. 32:21
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Finally, the principal purposes of the ADEA deferral provision are "(1) to
provide rapid and more expeditious disposition of cases, including mediation
rather than litigation, and (2) to avoid burdening the federal system.'1" As
discussed earlier, most courts that have considered the issue have concluded
that expanding the remedies available for age discrimination beyond those spe-
cifically provided for in the ADEA would serve neither purpose.'69 Applying
the deferral provision to save state wage payment acts with more expansive
remedies than those available under the ADEA instead would make ADEA
plaintiffs "less inclined to seek reconciliation,"'7 ° and thereby "encourag[e]
litigation rather than settlements[.]'1'
In short, the language and purpose of the ADEA deferral provision, cou-
pled with Congress' failure to include a true saving clause in the ADEA,'
suggest that Congress intended to preempt state laws that otherwise might be
available to expand the remedies provided for in the ADEA.' If that is cor-
rect,74 neither the courts nor state legislatures can disturb the federal statutory
scheme by "inserting into the ADEA [remedial] provision[s] which Congress
did not mention."'7"
VI. CONCLUSION
There is some support for the conclusion that state legislation intended to
supplement the ADEA is not preempted.176 That view is based in large mea-
sure on the proposition that the ADEA deferral provision" reflects Congress'
"approval of the use of state remedies.' 78
the California Department of Human Resources Development was not the type of state authority within the
contemplation of the ADEA deferral provision because there was no "specific [state] legislative mandate
directing the Department to act in the field of age discrimination."
168. Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 505 A.2d 580, 588 (NJ. 1986); see also Petrelle v. Weirton Steel Corp.,
953 F.2d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1991) ("The purpose of [the deferral provision] is to provide state agencies an
opportunity to resolve age discrimination complaints locally in the hope that a successful resolution will in-
duce complainants not to pursue suits in federal court.").
169. See supra notes 17, 100-14 and accompanying text.
170. Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 967 (10th Cir. 1987).
171. Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 851 F. Supp. 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
172. See generally Rose v. National Cash Register Corp., 703 F.2d 225, 229 (6th Cir. 1983) (observing
that Congress "selectively and expressly incorporated provisions of the FLSA... into the ADEA as it
deemed fit for that purpose").
173. In Zamore v. Dyer, 597 F. Supp. 923, 928 n.4 (D. Conn. 1984), the court observed that the statement
in the ADEA deferral provision that ADEA actions supersede state age discrimination actions operates "in
direct contrast" to Title VII's saving clause, which makes it clear that Title VII "does not preempt state law."
Cf. Martinez v. United Auto Workers, 772 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[t]he policy of defer-
ence to state authority ... is weaker [in the ADEA] than in Title vmI').
174. See generally William L. Lynch, Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YAlE Li. 363,
366 n.12 (1978) ("By forbidding courts to preempt certain state laws, a savings clause implicitly permits
preemption of other state laws. It is often argued that this implicit permission is a congressional mandate to
preempt the state laws that are not expressly saved.").
175. Rose, 703 F.2d at 229.
176. See, e.g., Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Kennebec Water Power Co., 468 A.2d 307, 310-11 (Me.
1983).
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1988).
178. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1046 n.17 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other
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However, the ADEA deferral provision does not expand an ADEA
plaintiffs federal rights.'79 It merely permits states to enact alternative age
discrimination legislation' that is expressly superseded by the ADEA in cas-
es where the federal statute is invoked. 8' Indeed, one court has concluded that
because the deferral provision specifically recognizes the primacy of federal
law," permitting recourse to state law remedies in ADEA actions would be
"nothing more than a pro forma gesture."'' Under this view, the remedies
provided for in the ADEA are the only ones available in cases brought under
the ADEA
84
On balance, the better view appears to be that in cases brought directly
under the ADEA, the statutory remedies provided therein are exclusive. 5 If
they prefer, victims of age discrimination can ignore the ADEA and bring suit
under a state law prohibiting age discrimination,8 6 in accordance with the
terms of the ADEA deferral provision."'a When the ADEA is invoked, howev-
er, the provisions of that act supersede alternative state laws because the choice
of appropriate remedies to enforce the ADEA is a matter for Congress, and not
the courts or state legislatures, to decide.'
In short, individuals claiming to have been discriminated against in viola-
tion of the ADEA must accept the act as they find it.' 9 If the ADEA as writ-
ten does not eradicate the evil sought to be remedied,"se Congress can act to
correct the problem,'9 ' just as it has done in other employment discrimination
contexts1 92 However, courts in ADEA cases should refrain from permitting
plaintiffs to invoke supplemental state law remedies that are more expansive
than the remedies available under the ADEA.'93
grounds, 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
179. See Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 505 A.2d 580, 587 (NJ. 1986).
180. See Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (N.D. 111. 1976), affd on rehear-
ing, 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1988).
182. See Nolan, 505 A.2d at 587 (stating that the ADEA is "dominant... over state remed[ies]").
183. Bertrand, 419 F. Supp. at 1127.
184. See Platt v. Burroughs, 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
185. Among other things, that conclusion serves a "paramount federal interest in uniformity" underlying
the ADEA. Nolan, 505 A.2d at 589. As one court has stated, employers in age discrimination cases should
not "be subject to varying and inconsistent state regulation in the several jurisdictions .... Id. at 587.
186. See, e.g., Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Kennebec Water Power Co., 468 A.2d 307 (Me. 1983);
Hillman v. Consumers Power Co., 282 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Simpson v. Alaska State Comm'n
for Human Rights, 423 F. Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976), affd, 608 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979).
187. See 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1988).
188. See Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1376 (4th Cir. 1989) (Mumaghan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is up to Congress, not this Court, to balance the risks and bene-
fits inherent in allowing alternative remedies to co-exist in the fight against [age] discrimination.").
189. See Platt, 424 F. Supp. at 1333.
190. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
191. See Platt, 424 F. Supp. at 1337.
192. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
193. See Platt, 424 F. Supp. at 1337.
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